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Arpin and Prados: Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA

definition of the term “victory” remains
out of grasp, despite centuries of learned
commentary on military affairs. Martel
casts his book as a preliminary investigation of the nature of victory. This
“pre-theoretical” inquiry, he declares, is
the best that can be achieved, given the
nature of war—a violent clash of wills
pervaded by uncertainty and strong
passions. Given these realities, no socialscience theory can tell political and military officials how they can arrange
matters to assure victory.
After surveying the works of classical
and modern strategic theorists, Martel
constructs a framework for analyzing
past wars and informing future deliberations on when and how to use force to
achieve policy objectives. Victory, says
Martel, can be classified by: its level,
designated (in descending order) grand
strategic, political-military, or tactical;
how, and how much, the war alters the
prewar status quo; how fully the victorious society mobilizes itself for war;
and the manner and scope of postwar
obligations incurred by the victor. The
author next uses this framework to classify several U.S. military actions, ranging from the 1986 Libya raid to
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Evaluating victory is an ambiguous undertaking, even using this analytical approach. The Libya raid yielded only a
“quasi-political-military victory,” inducing a change of political behavior on
Moammar Gadhafi’s part. The outcome
of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, sure to engender the most controversy among
Martel’s case studies, remains in doubt.
While American policy makers are
clearly thinking in terms of a thoroughgoing, grand-strategic victory that reorders Middle Eastern affairs, only a
partial victory is yet in hand, and even
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that result could slip away amid
terrorism and communal bloodletting.
Victory in War renders a service by improving our ability to learn from past
operations and think through future
operations before embarking on them.
Given the preliminary nature of
Martel’s work, certain issues await elucidation. Most notably, the terms affixed to the levels of victory—grand
strategic, political-military, and tactical—
imply that the author wants to invert
the familiar Clausewitzian relationship
between policy and strategy. Placing
grand-strategic victory above politicalmilitary victory in the hierarchy suggests that strategy—roughly speaking,
“grand strategy” means deploying diplomatic, economic, and ideological as
well as military power to realize policy
aims—ranks above politics in the order
of things. A taxonomy clearly affirming
the supremacy of policy would enhance
Martel’s analytical enterprise and its
relevance to practitioners and scholars
considerably.
In short, Victory in War marks the beginning of what promises to be a fruitful debate on matters of vital interest to
political and military leaders—and the
nations they serve.
JAMES R. HOLMES

Naval War College

Prados, John. Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars
of the CIA. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006. 696pp.
$35

In an era where overhead imagery is
available to anyone with a computer
and a credit card, where the twenty-fourhour cable news cycle drives government decisions and the Internet
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provides global connectivity, are secret
wars still possible? Not according to the
author of Safe for Democracy: The Secret
Wars of the CIA.
Veteran intelligence and policy writer
John Prados provides a detailed, if somewhat disjointed, chronology of CIA covert actions since the inception of the
agency. Prados describes the most recent
chapters in the long history of U.S. covert actions, dividing covert actions into
two types: political actions (including
propaganda and psychological operations) and paramilitary operations. Covert
and clandestine intelligence collections
are addressed only peripherally, often
when covert action and collection must
be weighed against one another.
Prados focuses on several common
threads. He describes the rivalries
within the CIA between the proponents
of political and paramilitary operations,
and between covert operations and
clandestine intelligence collections. He
also discusses the competition between
the rival “baronies” of the regional divisions within the agency’s Directorate of
Operations. The author generally takes
a negative view of covert actions, maintaining (for the most part) that they are
antithetical to American ideals. With
more justification, he points out that
covert actions rarely lead to permanent
solutions.
However, Prados makes several excellent points that are often overlooked.
First, CIA covert actions are carried out
on the orders of the president. The
varying degrees of control between different administrations, and the relationship between the president and his
Director of Central Intelligence, are key
factors that determine both the degree
of autonomy given to the agency and
the amount of operational detail a
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president receives. Even when given a
high degree of autonomy, the CIA has
operated under presidential guidance.
Second, Prados points out that from the
start it was impossible to keep covert
actions totally secret. Many of the operations discussed (such as the Bay of
Pigs, Angola, and in Southeast Asia)
could not be accomplished on that scale
today. Most importantly, Prados argues
that covert actions are a poor substitute
for policy.
At the end of this long and detailed
book, the reader is left feeling that something is missing. The author’s treatment
is not balanced, and one wonders if
other viewpoints would tell a different
story. Still, this is a valuable book for
students of intelligence activities.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia

Tillman, Barrett. LeMay. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007. 205pp. $21.95

Some great leaders are remembered
only as a caricature, and General Curtis
E. LeMay may be the epitome of this
unfortunate tendency. Mention LeMay,
and many see only the movie character
General “Buck” Turgidson in the 1964
film Dr. Strangelove. Barrett Tillman’s
balanced and concise depiction of
LeMay puts this limited (and largely inaccurate) view into context. More importantly, he retrieves some of the
enduring lessons of leadership that can
be learned from one of America’s greatest airmen.
This is precisely the intent of Palgrave
Macmillan’s “Great Generals” series.
These books—titles on Patton, Grant,
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